Over the past several months, the landscape of global automotive trade has shifted dramatically under the continued influence of Trump-era tariffs—policies originally framed as a tool to re-shore manufacturing and level the global playing field. Today, these tariffs are proving to be as much a diplomatic lever as they are an industrial policy—reshaping global supply chains and triggering a wave of new trade dynamics.

Since my last update, four major developments have redefined the conversation:

China restricts rare earth exports: On April 4, China tightened export licenses for seven rare earth elements critical to EVs. With China controlling 99% of global processing, this move risks serious supply chain disruptions.

U.S.–China agree to tariff truce: Effective May 12, U.S. tariffs on Chinese autos drop from 145% to 30%; China lowers duties from 125% to 10%. Temporary relief, but long-term risks remain unresolved.

Steel and aluminum tariffs doubled: On June 3, the Trump administration raised Section 232 tariffs from 25% to 50%, sharply increasing costs for U.S. automakers and suppliers reliant on international steel and aluminum.

U.K.–U.S. trade deal signed: Signed on May 8, the agreement sets a 10% tariff cap on U.K. vehicles—lower than USMCA rates. GM and Ford warn it threatens North American sourcing competitiveness.

Each of these developments reflects a broader shift in how tariffs are being used—not just to punish foreign competitors, but to shape future trade frameworks. In the sections that follow, we’ll examine each of these events in greater depth and explore their implications for global supply chains, manufacturing competitiveness, and trade negotiations still to come.

China Restricts Rare Earth Exports

On April 4, China imposed new export license requirements on seven rare earth elements critical to modern vehicles—samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium. These elements are essential to NdFeB magnets used in EV traction motors, auxiliary motors, LED lighting, displays, speakers, and aluminum alloys. With China responsible for over 90% of global rare earth processing—and license approvals reportedly delayed or denied for nearly 75% of requests—OEMs and suppliers are facing bottlenecks eerily reminiscent of the semiconductor shortages of 2021–2022.

The impact has been immediate. Ford temporarily halted production of its Explorer SUV in Chicago, while BMW and other European automakers reported supplier shutdowns. U.S. suppliers’ group MEMA has warned of cascading risks to automotive manufacturing, particularly if license restrictions remain opaque or prolonged. Although China claims the rules are non-discriminatory, its new tracking systems and quota mechanisms point to a long-term strategy of geopolitical leverage.

As the U.S., EU, Japan, and India attempt to secure exemptions or faster processing, OEMs are urgently reevaluating sourcing strategies and lobbying for domestic rare earth refinement capacity. Without meaningful diversification, the auto industry remains exposed to a single chokepoint—this time not from production capacity, but from geopolitical control.

U.S.–China Agree to Tariff Truce

In Geneva on May 12, the United States and China reached a temporary 90-day truce, sharply reducing their respective retaliatory tariffs. The U.S. slashed its tariffs on Chinese goods from 145% down to 30%, while China eased its duties on U.S. imports from 125% to 10%. This agreement paused significant tariffs introduced since early April, including the “Liberation Day” measures.

The U.S. 145% tariff encompassed multiple layers: a 20% tariff tied to fentanyl concerns, a 34% “Liberation Day” reciprocal tariff, and additional duties totaling 125% on top of that. Correspondingly, China’s 125% tariff derailed U.S. auto exports and supplier channels to China, though Beijing implemented limited exemptions for goods like pharmaceuticals and aircraft components.

Markets reacted favorably, with U.S. equity indices surging on hopes of easing trade tensions; however, analysts cautioned the reprieve would be short-lived if no broader resolution is achieved. The truce leaves in place section 232 tariffs on autos, steel, and aluminum, underscoring persistent trade volatility.

Key risks remain: China has accused the U.S. of violating the truce—particularly through persistent export controls on rare earths and chip technologies—and warned of retaliatory action. Meanwhile, investors emphasize that a ceiling of 30% on Chinese goods and a floor of 10% on U.S. goods could become structural if no final agreement is reached.

For the automotive sector, the truce offers short-term relief from extreme tariff exposure. However, the neoliberal trade environment remains precarious: unless permanent, deeper agreements materialize, OEMs and suppliers must operate within a 90-day window of elevated uncertainty.

Steel & Aluminum Tariffs Doubled

On June 3, the Trump administration, citing national security concerns, raised Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from 25% to 50%, effective June 4—excluding the U.K., which remains at 25% pending its trade agreement. This sweeping adjustment covers all base metals and their downstream derivatives, with import duties now applied specifically to the steel/aluminum content of broader products.

A typical vehicle includes ~2,100 lbs of steel and ~400 lbs of aluminum. At April spot prices, that represents approximately $870 in steel and $450 in aluminum—totaling $1,320 per vehicle—about 53% of raw materials cost. A 25-percentage-point tariff hike would add $330 per vehicle, translating into $1.1B, $0.8B, and $0.5B of annual cost increases for GM, Ford, and Stellantis North America, respectively. Ford, with its F-Series and higher aluminum content, is particularly at risk.

Despite market expectations, steel prices saw only modest immediate increases after the announcement—possibly because markets expect temporary relief through broader trade deals. Supplier-specific exposure varies, while companies like Magna (MGA) and Dana (DAN) face significant steel risk, others like APTIV and Visteon (VC) may absorb impacts more easily or even benefit from scrap metal offsets.

Historically, during Trump’s first term, commodity headwinds added $1.6B for Ford and $1.3B for GM annually. With a typical two-quarter lag between spot prices and contractual adjustments, automakers must decide whether to absorb costs, pass them to consumers, or renegotiate supplier contracts. If sustained into late 2025 or 2026, these tariffs pose a persistent margin threat, especially absent mitigating measures like USMCA exemptions, product redesign, or raw material hedging.

U.K.–U.S. Trade Deal Signed

On May 8, the U.K. and U.S. finalized an Economic Prosperity Deal capping tariffs on British vehicle imports at 10% (for the first 100,000 units annually), down from the prior 27.5%, while eliminating U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs under specific quotas. This came as part of a broader sectoral agreement exchanging access for U.S. beef and ethanol under new quotas.

Although this offers a reprieve to British exporters like Jaguar Land Rover—now one of the U.S.’s top destination markets—American automakers immediately criticized the deal. The American Automotive Policy Council, representing GM, Ford, and Stellantis, warned that discounting U.K. imports below USMCA equivalents creates a perverse incentive to shift sourcing to the U.K., undermining North American production and suppliers.

The broader significance lies in how this deal was structured: not as a long-term commitment to protectionism, but as a negotiating tactic. Capping U.K. tariffs at 10% sends the message that these are acceptable terms—with promised reductions linked to trade security and reciprocal concessions. Going forward Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Canada now negotiate understanding 10% is an achievable result.

For OEMs already planning to invest in U.S. assembly—like Volkswagen, Hyundai, and BMW—these negotiations provide an opportunity for a political win. But for North American-centric manufacturers, such as GM or Ford, there is no clear policy forcing production back from Canada or Mexico. Instead, they’re seeing a tactical, headline-driven US trade posture where ultimately, 10% is not the result of a long-term policy shift, but a negotiation tactic.

Conclusion

While politically expedient, this U.K. deal is a sign of tactical diplomacy, not a sustained industrial shift. For manufacturers, the message is clear: trade policy will continue to be fluid, deal-centric, and opportunistic. Supply chain strategies must remain agile and responsive—not predicated on long-term industrial policy shift.